By Prakash Chandra Lohani
The idea of destroying capitalism with the aid of the capitalist
remains one of the essential characteristics of Marxist theology. Now two
leading professors of Finance from the Graduate School of Business,
Rajan and Zingales make it a central point to emphasise the fact that a
competitive market system, especially the financial system rests on a fragile
political infrastructure whose norms and values have kept on changing even in
advanced democracies depending upon the ability of the economic system to
generate employment and distribute the national pie on a broad and equitable
scale. In the first part of the 20th century inspite of the first world war, a
generally booming economy based on the concept of a minimalist government, the
acceptance of gold standard for international transactions and the free market
concept provided a value framework of economic decisions that encouraged
financial development and made it easy for new enterprises to create wealth and
income in the society.
The depression in the late 1920’s changed this generally accepted
framework. The notion that the free market system was unfair to the workers and
the new middle class gained strength. Politicians were quick to capitalise on
this new trend and promote a new value framework that justified government intervention
in investments decisions. The authors quote a lot from President Roosevelt’s
speeches during the period to dramatise the shift. The pendulum swung from a
minimalist to an interventionist government that included the suppression of
the financial system and the closing of cross-border capital flows. Here was a
case where economic disturbances quickly translated into political decisions
that gave a new thrust to restricting competition and openness in international
economic transactions. There was, however, more than politics involved in these
decisions.
Restricting competition was also in the interest of large corporations
and other industrial establishments because it served their interests to
protect profit and avoid internal adjustments that may have been necessary in a
more competitive environment. The interests of the incumbents—those who stand
to gain from the status quo or an interventionist set of policies—did play a
major role in the continuation of the domineering role of the government because
it helped to maintain profit without much effort. The message is clear that in
both the poor and the rich countries the incumbents who are better organised
and stand to gain from an active dominant government will use their political
connections to promote their interests even though it is detrimental to the
general public. The policy tends to continue because the need for organising a
countervailing force to challenge is not felt seriously, especially during
times of fast growth in output and employment for two reasons.
First, in times of rising employment people are less concerned about the
inefficiencies or inequities of the system that may include various forms of
corny capitalism captured in its new incarnation as “relationship capitalism”.
Second, the cost of inefficiency is distributed widely with the result that for
most people rational ignorance is seen as reasonable response. During times of
economic strain, however, “rational ignorance” can easily turn into irrational
anger against the incumbents and generally against the philosophy of free
market and an open economy. Politicians are of course more than willing to tap
these sentiments if it leads to power. Here is a situation where political
interests and economic thinking reinforce each other to restrict capitalist
competition and suppress the operation of the free markets.
The last quarter of the 20th century has seen a progressive decline of
relationship capitalism. It was a system supported by the Bretton Woods
framework that discouraged free cross-border movement of capital. Changing
technology, greater reliance on the market and increasing liberalisation of
cross-border capital flows have posed an effective challenge to the coalition
of forces that thrived on relationship capitalism. On the other hand, it is
also becoming clear that the “invisible hand” theorem if it is to work
reasonably in real life needs the visible hand of the government to assure
competition. The authors emphasise the not so obvious fact that “a competitive
form of market” is a public good that ironically needs the visible hand of the
government for maintenance. On this count, communism as an economic and a
political system is at a double loss since it allows competition neither in
politics nor economics. State capitalism and one party dictatorship combine
together to produce a system that goes on to internalise a set of political and
economic values that are completely against the humanitarian vision that Marx
presented as his utopia.
The maintenance of competition is not easy or simple. There will always
be forces arrayed against it since they see their privileges and position being
threatened by new entrants claiming for a piece of action. In the context of a
rapidly changing technology this logic applies to both the traded and non
traded sectors. A worker in a call centre in a developing country can easily be
projected as threatening the job of computer operator in a developed nation.
There is therefore an inherent possibility to restrict competition with the slogan
that you are protecting “your” people, thus preserving the gains available to
the few from a restricted economic environment. In politics what is often
apparent may not be real. High-sounding slogans projecting national interests
in this context can easily become a veil for protecting some people’s vested
interest. Ultimately, if people are not careful the evolving coalition of
interests against a competitive market in goods and services can easily
degenerate into an economic system that is controlled by the few for the
benefit of the few. Once the concentration of productive assets in a few hands
gains momentum the forces against a competitive system become increasingly
assertive and strong.
To promote a competitive economy it is necessary to create an incentive
structure that encourages competition. This is especially true in the financial
sector where informal and cozy arrangements between the banks and large
business houses may put them in same wavelength on the question of competition
and liberalisation. A more competitive and open financial market on the other
hand could be expected to reduce the cost of capital and encourage new entrants
in the economy. This may weaken the power of the vested interests and force
them to think of new strategies of change and innovation.
The concern for a competitive economic structure is not just the concern
of the developed nations; it is vitally important for developing countries as
well. Most developing countries and for that matter the so-called transition
economies have a fragile political structure that is often incapable of
checking the monopoly tendencies of old and new vested interests that thrive on
highly skewed distribution of assets, legal uncertainties regarding property
rights and similar other risks that increase the transaction cost of doing
business for the small and medium sized entrepreneur and businessmen. The lack
of opportunity for the small man on the other hand strikes at the very root of
a liberal democratic system and can easily lead people to seek for solutions
that could very well be a new model of corny capitalism.
A liberal democratic framework should therefore be able to create incentives for competition and it could well mean among other things, a vigorous growth of the financial sector on a broad scale so that it opens opportunities for new entrants in the economic system. If this is missing a liberal democratic framework could easily end up as a new variant of constitutional formalism where the gap between prescription and practice continues to remain wide as ever. In this setting, competition as a public good becomes the casualty and the capitalists become the adversaries of capitalism.